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DOCUMENTS DEPARTMENT 
pr. / CJb2 SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD 
During 1967 private contributions to the University 
of Montana Foundation established the Maureen and 
Mike Mansfield Endowment to honor Montana's 
senior senator, an alumnus and professor-on-leave 
from the University. The Mansfield Lectures on 
International Relations will bring authorities on 
foreign affairs to the campus for public lectures, 
student seminars and discussions. On March 29, 1968 
Senator Mansfield initiated the serie~ with this 
lecture. 
Viet Nam is heavy on the heart of the nation. The 
Vietnamese war is a tragedy. It is a tragedy in the 
American lives which it claims. It is a tragedy in the 
death and devastation which, in the name of salva-
tion, it has spread throughout Viet Nam. 
My views on United States policy respectingc Viet 
Nam are no secret. I have stated them, restated them, 
and elaborated them many times. I have cautioned 
against an ever-deepening military involvement in 
that conflict. I am opposed to any increase in it to-
day. I believe that the way out of a barbarous situa-
tion is not to go further into it. 
The first step towards peace, in my judgment, is to 
concentrate and consolidate the United States mili-
tary effort and to escalate the peace effort, looking 
towards the negotiation of an honorable end of the 
conflict. 
That, in brief, is the way I feel about Viet Nam. 
That is the way I have felt about it for a long time. 
The President knows it. The Senate knows it. Mon-
tana knows it. 
What I have to say to you, today, touches only 
indirectly on Viet Nam. My remarks are intended to 
go beyond Viet Nam to what may well be the roots 
of the war. In this first lecture of the series on 
international affairs, I wish to address your attention 
to what is the great void in the foreign relations of 
this nation-to the question of China. 
As a nation, we have lived through a generation 
in only hearsay association with a third of the entire 
human race. At the inception of this void, we were 
engaged in a costly and indecisive conflict in Korea-
on China's northeast frontier. Two decades later, we 
are engaged once again in a costly and indecisive 
conflict, this time on China's southeast frontier. 
These two great military involvements on the Chi-
nese periphery are not unrelated to the absence of 
relevant contact between China and the United 
States. 
Sooner or later a tenuous truce may be achieved in 
Viet Nam even as a truce was achieved in Korea. In 
my judgment, however, there will be no durable 
peace in Korea, Viet Nam or anywhere else in Asia 
unless there is a candid confrontation with the prob-
lems of the Sino-United States relationship. 
China needs peace if the potentials of its cultures 
are to be realized. This nation needs peace for the 
same reason. In this day and age, the world needs 
peace for civilized survival. You young people have 
the greatest stake in peace. For that reason, I ask you 
to look beyond Viet Nam, behind Korea, to what may 
well be the core of the failure of peace in Asia-to 
the United States-Chinese estrangement of two 
decades. 
In 1784, Robert Morris, a signer of the Declaration 
of Independence, sent the first American clipper ship 
to trade with China. The year that President George 
Washington took the oath of office, 1789, fourteen 
American ships were riding at anchor in the Pearl 
River off Canton in South China. 
There are no American ships in Chinese ports to-
day. There have not been for almost twenty years. 
In twenty years, hardly an American doctor, scien-
tist, businessman, journalist, student, or even a 
tourist has set foot in China. 
Across the Pacific Ocean, we and the Chinese 
glare at one another uncomprehendingly, apprehen-
sively and suspiciously. In the United States, there 
is fear of the sudden march of Chinese armies into 
Southeast Asia. In China, there is fear of a tighter 
American encirclement and American nuclear attack. 
We see millions of Chinese soldiers poised on 
China's frontiers. We see leaders who threaten in a 
most violent way. We see an internal Chinese tur-
moil to confirm our fears of irrationality and reck-
lessness. Finally, we see a growing nuclear power, 
with the looming spectre of a full-fledged Chinese 
intercontinental ballistic missile force. 
On the other hand, the Chinese see themselves 
surrounded by massive American military power. 
They see United States naval, ground, and air bases 
scattered through Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Okinawa, 
Guam, the Philippines, and Thailand. They see over 
half a million American troops in neighboring Viet 
Nam and hundreds of thousands more nearby. They 
see tremendous nuclear capability with missiles 
zeroed in on Chinese cities. They see the United 
States as "occupying" the Chinese island of Taiwan 
and supporting a Chinese government whose de-
clared aim is the recapture of the mainland. And they 
see, too, what they describe as a growing collusion 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, a 
country which they believe infringes China's borders, 
threatens to corrupt the Chinese revolution and exer-
cises an unwelcome influence throughout Asia. 
Shifting Attitudes 
We and the Chinese have not always looked at one 
another with such baleful mistrust. The American 
images of China have fluctuated and shifted in an 
almost cyclical way. There has been the image of the 
China of wisdom, intelligence, industry, piety, 
stoicism, and strength. This is the China of Marco 
Polo, Pearl Buck, Charlie Chan, and heroic resistance 
to the Japanese during World War IL 
On the other hand, there has been the image of 
the China of cruelty, barbarism, violence, and face-
less hordes. This is the China of drum-head trials, 
summary executions, Fu Manchu, the Boxer Rebel-
lion-the China that is summed up in the phrase 
"yellow peril." 
Throughout our history, these two images have 
alternated, with first one predominant and then the 
other. In the eighteenth century, we looked up to 
China as an ancient civilization-superior in many 
aspects of technology, culture and social order and 
surrounded by an air of splendid mystery. Respect 
turned to contempt, however, with China's quick 
defeat by the British in the Opium War of 1840. There 
followed acts of humiliation of China such as partici-
pation in extra-territorial treaty rights and the 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. 
Attitudes shifted again in the early twentieth cen-
tury to one of benevolence largely in consequence of 
the influence of missionaries. There were more mis-
sionaries in China from the United States than from 
any other country. More American missionaries 
served in China than anywhere else in the world. The 
Chinese became, for this nation, a guided, guarded 
and adored people. 
Chinese resistance to the Japanese invasion in 1937 
produced another shift from benevolence to admira-
tion. At the end of the Second World War, admira-
tion was displaced by disappointment and frustra-
tion, as the wartime truce between Nationalist and 
Communist forces collapsed in cataclysmic internal 
strife. This nation became profoundly disenchanted 
with China, a disenchantment which was replaced 
abruptly in 1949 by hostility. 
The hostility was largely a reaction, of course, to 
the coming to power of a Communist regime on the 
Chinese mainland. We did not interpret this event 
as a consequence of the massive difficulties and the 
vast inner weaknesses of a war-torn China. Rather, 
we saw it almost as an affront to this nation. We 
saw it as a treacherous extension of the Soviet steam-
roller policies which had reduced Eastern and Cen-
tral Europe to subservience at the end of World War 
IL 
Then, in 1948, came a Communist coup in Czecho-
slovakia and the Soviet attempt to blockade Berlin. 
The triumph of a Communist government in China 
followed immediately after these events in Europe. 
The nation was shaken to its fingertips. 
Still, the press of events continued relentlessly. In 
June 1950, the North Koreans launched a sudden 
attack on South Korea. The Chinese forces inter-
vened in the war in November of that year. The 
United States was brought into a major military 
confrontation in which, for the first time, the Chinese 
were enemies and not allies. 
American Policy Assumptions 
After these events, the assumptions of American 
policy towards China were revised. An effort was 
made to meet both the concern and outrage respect-
ing China which existed in this nation and the revo-
lutionary militancy of the new Chinese regime in 
Asia. Policy was cast anew on the premise that the 
government on the Chinese mainland was an aggres-
sor which, subject to directions from Moscow, would 
use force to impose international Communism on 
Asia. Conversely, it was assumed that if the endorse-
ment of the free nations were witheld, this regime 
which was said to be "alien" to the Chinese people-
some sort of overgrown puppet of Moscow-would 
wither and eventually collapse. 
On this basis, recognition was not extended to 
Peking. The official view was that the National 
Government, which had retreated to the island of 
Taiwan, continued to speak for all of China. We cut 
off all trade with the mainland and did what could be 
done to encourage other countries to follow suit. In 
a similar fashion, we led a diplomatic campaign year 
after year against the seating of the Chinese People's 
Republic in the United Nations. We drew an arc of 
military alliances on the seaward side of China and 
undergirded them with the deployment of massive 
American military power in bases throughout the 
Western Pacific. 
Much has happened to call into question the as-
sumptions in which these policies towards China 
have been rooted. In the first place, the People's 
Republic has shown itself to be neither a part of a 
Communist monolith nor a carbon copy of Soviet 
Russia. The fact is that, of .the numerous divisions 
which have arisen within the Communist world, the 
differences between Moscow and Peking have been 
the most significant. They so remain today although 
the more rasping edges of the conflict appear some-
what tempered by the war in Viet Nam. 
At the same time, the government on the mainland 
has not only survived, it has provided China with a 
functioning leadership. Under its direction, Chinese 
society has achieved a degree of economic and scien-
tific progress, apparently sufficient for survival of 
an enormous and growing population and sophisti-
cated enough to produce thermo-nuclear explosions. 
In the last two years, the so-called Cultural Revo-
not been found in direct or unilateral violation of 
these agreements. It is not impossible that a similar 
settlement, with Chinese participation, might be 
reached on Viet Nam. 
Indeed, it is to be devoutly hoped that there can 
be a solution along these lines. Unless it is found, 
there is a very real danger-as the Korean exper-
ience shows-that the prolongation of war on China's 
frontiers may well bring about another United 
States-Chinese armed confrontation. 
Two Chinas? 
Perhaps the most important element in the rebuild-
ing of stable relations with China is to be found in a 
solution of the problem of Taiwan. It may help to 
come to grips with this issue, if it is understood at the 
outset that the island of Taiwan is Chinese. That is 
the position of the National Government of the Re-
public of China. That is the position of the People's 
Republic of China. For a quarter of a century, this 
common Chinese position has been reinforced by the 
policies and actions of the United States government. 
Since that is the case, I do not believe that a solu-
tion to the Taiwan question is facilitated by its state-
ment in terms of a two-China policy, as has been sug-
gested in some quarters in recent years. The fact is 
that there is one China which happens to have been 
divided into two parts by events which occurred a 
long time ago. Key factors in the maintenance of 
peace between the separate segments have been the 
interposition of United States military power in the 
Taiwan Straits, and the strengthening of the National 
Government of China by massive injections of econo-
mic and military aid. 
This course was followed by the United States for 
many reasons, not the least of which was that it made 
possible a refuge for dedicated allies and associates in 
the war against Japan. Most of all, however, it was 
followed because to have permitted the closing of the 
breach by a military clash of the two opposing Chi-
nese forces would have meant a massive bloodbath 
and, in the end, the rekindling of another great war 
in Asia. 
However, the situation has changed in the Western 
Pacific. Taiwan is no longer abjectly dependent for 
its survival on the United States. Some of the pas-
sions of the deep Chinese political division have 
cooled with the passing of time. Another generation 
has appeared and new Chinese societies, in effect, 
have grown up on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. 
Is there not, then,. some better way to confront this 
problem than threat-and-counter-threat between is-
land Chinese and mainland Chinese? Is there not 
some better way to live with this situation than by 
the armed truce which depends, in the last analysis, 
on the continued presence of the United States 
Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits? 
The questions cannot be answered until all in-
volved are prepared to take a fresh look at the situa-
tion. It seems to me that it might be helpful if there 
could be, among the Chinese themselves, an exam-
ination of the possibilities of improving the climate. 
As I have already indicated, the proper framework 
for any such consideration would be an acceptance 
of the contention of both Chinese groups-that there 
is only one China and Taiwan is a part of it. In that 
context, the questions at issue have to do with the 
dichotomous situation as between mainland and is-
land governments and the . possibility of bringing 
about constructive changes therein by peaceful 
means. 
There is no cause to be sanguine about the pros-
pects of an approach of this kind. One can only hope 
that time may have helped to ripen the circumstances 
for settlement. It is apparent, for example, that the 
concept which held the Chinese government on Tai-
wan to be the sole hope of China's redemption has 
grown less relevant with the years. For Taiwan, 
therefore, to remain isolated from the mainland is 
to court the risk that the island will be left once 
again, as it has been on other occasions, in the back-
wash of Chinese history. 
The removal of the wedge of separation, moreover, 
would also seem to accord with the interests of the 
mainland Chinese government. It does have a 
legitimate concern in the reassertion of the historic 
connection of Taiwan and China. It does have a con-
cern in ending the hostile division which has been 
costly and disruptive both within China and in 
China's international relationships. 
From the point of view of the United States, too, 
there is an interest in seeking a less tenuous situation. 
Progress in settling the Taiwan question could con-
tribute to a general relaxation of tensions in the 
Western Pacific and, conceivably, even to resolution 
of the conflict in Viet Nam. Certainly, it would make 
possible a reduction in the enormous and costly over-
all defense burdens which were assumed in Asian 
waters after World War II and which, two decades 
later, still rest on the shoulders of this nation. 
To sum up, then, it seems to me that the basic ad-
justment which is needed in policies respecting China 
is to make crystal clear that this government does not 
anticipate, much less does it seek, the overthrow of 
the government of the Chinese mainland. In addi-
tion, there is a need to end the discrimination which 
consigns China to an inferior status as among the 
Communist countries in this nation's policies respect-
ing travel and trade. Finally, it ought to be made 
unequivocal that we are prepared at all times to meet 
with Chinese representatives-formally or informal-
ly-in order to consider differences between China 
and the United States over Viet Nam or any other 
question of common concern. 
A New Start 
Adjustments of this kind in the policies of the na-
tion, it seems to me, require above all else a fresh 
perspective. We need to see the situation in Asia as it 
is today, not as it appeared twenty years ago in the 
Himalayan upheaval of the Chinese revolution. We 
need to see the situation not through the fog of an 
old and stagnant hostility but in the light of the en-
during interests of the United States in the Western 
Pacific. 
of the other Western democracies have, in fact, long 
since done regarding their Chinese relationships? 
New Approaches to China 
I must say that the deepening of the conflict in 
Viet Nam makes adjustments in policies respecting 
China more difficult. Indeed, the present course of 
events in Viet Nam almost insures that there shall 
be no changes. It is not easy to contemplate an alle-
viation with any nation which cheers on those who 
are engaged in inflicting casualties on Americans. 
Yet, it may well be that this alleviation is an essen-
tial aspect of ending the war and, hence, American 
casualties. That consideration, alone, it seems to me, 
makes initiatives towards China desirable now. 
There are several obvious areas in which these 
initiatives would have relevance. Discriminatory 
restriction on travel to China, for example, is cer-
tainly one of these areas. The Chinese may or may 
not admit Americans to their country, as they choose. 
But it is difficult to understand why our own govern-
ment should in any way, shape, or form seek to stand 
in the way of the attempts of American citizens to 
breach the great wall of estrangement between the 
two nations. It is, indeed, ironic that during the past 
three years there have been more visits of Americans 
to North Viet Nam, a nation with which we are at 
war, than to China in the past thirteen years. 
On the question of travel, it should be recalled that 
the Chinese were the first to suggest in 1956 that 
American journalists visit China. The suggestion was 
summarily rejected by the then Secretary of State. 
When, later, it was decided to accept the suggestion, 
the Chinese had changed their minds. Since that 
time, this nation has been more inclined to ease the 
travel barriers, on the basis of official agreement for 
exchanges of persons, but the Chinese have shown 
no disposition to enter into agreements or, for that 
matter, to admit Americans on any basis. 
In any event, it seems to me that it is in the positive 
interest of this nation to encourage Americans, if 
they can gain entry, to travel to China. May I add, I 
refer not merely to the travel of selected journalists, 
doctors, and other specialists, as is now the policy, 
but to the travel of any responsible American. In the 
same fashion, it seems to me most appropriate to ad-
mit Chinese travelers to the United States under the 
same conditions that pertain to visitors from other 
Communist countries. 
Trade is another area in which long-standing poli-
cies respecting China are open to serious question. 
Technically, this country still maintains an embargo 
on all trade with China. The basis for this policy is 
compliance with a voluntary resolution of the United 
Nations which was adopted at our behest at the time 
of the Korean conflict. It is doubtful that the resolu-
tion ever carried much weight among the trading 
nations of the world. In any case, it has long since 
been forgotten. Today, the principal nations in the 
China trade in rough order of importance are the· 
United Kingdom, Japan, the Soviet Union, West 
Germany, Australia, Canada, Italy and France. Of 
all the great maritime nations, the United States 
alone clings to a total trade embargo with China. 
Moreover, we are also the only nation in the world 
which makes an effort to enforce what can best be 
described as a kind of secondary boycott of re-
exported Chinese products. 
These policies have had little visible economic im-
pact, but they have had the most serious political 
repercussions. It is conceivable that, to the Chinese, 
the policies are something of an irritant. To friendly 
nations, however, they have been a source of constant 
friction. Most serious, their continuance over the 
years has injected unnecessary venom into the atmo-
sphere of United States-Chinese relations. 
Nor can it be said that the situation in Viet Nam 
has compelled the pursuit of the embargo and boy-
cott. The fact is that these restrictions were in place 
before most Americans ever heard of Viet Nam, and, 
certainly, long before Americans became involved in 
the war. If the Vietnamese conflict is now seen as 
justification for leaving these policies undisturbed, 
what is to be said of the existing attitude toward 
trade with other Communist countries? 
The fact is that the European Communists are pro-
viding North Viet Nam and the Viet Cong with so-
phisticated military equipment which, from all 
reports, exceeds in value the assistance which comes 
from China. On what basis, then, is it meaningful to 
permit and even to encourage non-strategic trade 
with the European Communist countries while hold-
ing to a closed-door policy on trade with China? 
What constructive purpose is served by the distinc-
tion? Any rationalization of relations with China, it 
seems to me, will require an adjustment of this dual 
approach. We need to move in the direction of equal 
treatment of all Communist nations in trade matters, 
whatever that treatment may be. 
In any event, problems of travel and trade are 
secondary obstacles in the development of a more 
stable relationship between China and the United 
States. There are other far more significant difficul-
ties. I refer, principally, to the question of Taiwan 
and to the war in Viet Nam. 
There is no doubt that the Chinese government 
seeks in Viet Nam a government which is friendly, 
if not subservient. Peking has not concealed, more-
over, its desire for the withdrawal of American mili-
tary power from Southeast Asia. It does not follow, 
however, that the price of peace in Southeast Asia is 
either Chinese domination or U. S. military interven-
tion. That is a black and white oversimplification of 
a gray situation. The fact is that neither Burma on 
China's border nor Cambodia have been "enslaved" 
by China, despite an association of many years, de-
spite periodic difficulties with the great state to the 
north and despite an absence of United States sup-
port, aid, or protection. These two nations have man-
aged to survive in a state of detachment from the 
power rivalries of the region. Furthermore, China is 
a signatory to the settlements which emerged from 
the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962 and which 
contain at least a hope for a middle way to peace in 
Indo-China. So far as I am aware, the Chinese have 
lution in China has rekindled what has been a 
periodic expectation that the Peking government is 
on the verge of collapse and the way is open for a 
military return to the mainland of the National Gov-
ernment on Taiwan. There seems to be little doubt 
that the turmoil in China has caused serious disrup-
tions. What appears in conflict in the cultural revo-
lution, however, is not the Peking structure as such 
but the adequacy of its ideological content. That 
would be a far cry from the kind of popular revulsion 
which might be expected to open the doors to a new 
regime. 
In any event, the worst of the upheavals within 
China appear to have ended months ago, without any 
irreparable break in the continuity of the govern-
ment or the operations of the economy. It is the 
height of folly to envision, in the present situation, 
an occasion for the overthrow of the Peking govern-
ment by external military pressures. Indeed, what 
would be better calculated to end, overnight, the re-
maining ferment on the mainland than a plausible 
threat to the security of China or an actual attack on 
Chinese territory? 
Chinese Actions Assessed 
If the People's Republic, then, is here to stay, what 
of the other assumption on which this nation's policy 
respecting China has long been based? What of the 
assumption that the Chinese government is an ex-
panding and aggressive force? That it is restrained 
from sweeping through Asia because we elected to 
meet its challenge along the 17th Parallel which di-
vides the Northern and Southern parts of Viet Nam? 
In recent years, the present Chinese government 
has not shown any great eagerness to use force to 
spread its ideology elsewhere in Asia although Chi-
nese armies have been employed in assertion of the 
traditional borders of China. To be sure, China has 
given enthusiastic encouragement and p r o mi s e d 
support to wars of national liberation. However, 
China has not participated directly in these wars and 
support, when forthcoming, has been limited and 
circumspect. 
In Viet Nam, for example, there is certainly Chi-
nese encouragement and aid for the North Vietna-
mese and the Viet Cong. Chinese involvement, how-
ever, has been far more peripheral than our own. 
The enemy soldiers with whom we are compelled to 
grapple are all Vietnamese and, in fact, mostly South 
Vietnamese. At every stage of the war, the assistance 
we have provided to South Viet Nam has far ex-
ceeded the aid from China and from all outside 
sources to the Viet Cong and North Viet Nam-both 
in terms of men and materiel. There is Chinese 
equipment in South Viet Nam but there are no Chi-
nese battalions. Even in North Viet Nam, Chinese 
manpower is reported to amount, at most, to one-
tenth of our forces in Viet Nam, and the great bulk of 
these Chinese are labor troops, some involved in air-
defense but most of them engaged in repairing bomb , 
damage to roads, railroads, bridges and the like. 
Chinese actions in Tibet, and along the Himalayan 
frontier of India, are often cited as evidence of mili-
tant Chinese Communist aggression. The fact is, 
however, that Tibet has been regarded for many dec-
ades as falling within China's over-all boundaries. 
Not only the Peking government but also the Chinese 
National Government on Taiwan insists that Tibet 
belongs to China. India also acknowledges such to be 
the case. Indeed, American policy has never recog-
nized Tibet as other than Chinese territory. 
In the case of the border war with India in 1962, 
the Chinese Communists occupied territories which, 
again, not only they, but also the Chinese National-
ists, consider to be Chinese. It is not precisely char.:. 
acteristic of a militant expansionism, moreover, for a 
government to withdraw its military forces from a 
territory which they have invested. Yet, the Peking 
government did so from parts of India which were 
occupied in 1962 as well as from North Korea. 
As for indirect aggression through economic means, 
China has been able to exert only a limited influence, 
either through aid or trade. In Africa and, indeed, in 
Southeast Asia, where attempts have been made to 
use trade and aid for political ends, the results have 
not been conspicuously successful. The fact is that 
most of China's trade today rests on a commercial-
economic base. It is carried on largely with the non-
Communist countries, including, may I add, many of 
our closest allies. 
In short, to speak of China, today, as aggressively 
expansionist is to respond to Chinese words rather 
than Chinese actions. That is not to say that China 
will not pose all manner of threats tomorrow. If 
there are not enough nightmares already, consider 
the prospects when China's nuclear capabilities will 
have been extensively developed, along with a full-
fledged intercontinental ballistic missile force. 
Of course, there is an immense potential danger in 
China, but there is also an immense potential danger 
in every other powerful nation in a world which has 
not yet learned how to maintain civilized survival 
in a nuclear age except on the razor's edge. Insofar 
as China is concerned, the fundamental question for 
us is not whether it is a danger, real or potential. 
The fundamental question is whether our present 
policies act to alleviate or to exacerbate the danger. 
Do we forestall the danger by jousting with the shad-
ows and suspicions of the past? Do we help by a 
continuance in policies which do little if anything to 
lift the heavy curtain of mutual ignorance and hos-
tility? 
Like it or not, the present Chinese government is 
here to stay. Like it or not, China is a major power 
in Asia and is on the way to becoming a nuclear 
power. Is it, therefore, in this nation's interest and in 
the interest of world peace to put aside, once and for 
all, what have been the persistent but futile attempts 
to isolate China? Is it, therefore, in this nation's 
interest and in the interest of world peace to try 
conscientiously and consistently to do whatever we 
can do-and, admittedly, it is not much-to reshape 
the relationship with the Chinese along more con-
structive and stable lines? In short, is it propitious 
for this nation to try to do what the policies of most 
In this context we will better be able to find appro-
priate responses at appropriate times to the specific 
problems of the Sino-United States relationship, 
whether they have to do with United Nations repre-
sentation or diplomatic recognition or the off-shore 
islands: ·or' Whatever. \,:Withol!t ;,prior adjustment in 
perspective,. h6weyer,·. tO seek to deal definitively 
with these questfo:hs ·w.buld be, to say the least, an 
exercise in futility. 
I should emphasize :. b~~ore concluding that it is 
unlikely that there will be any eager Chinese re-
sponses to:initiatives on gur. part. Nevertheless, I see 
nothing to be lost for this nation in trying to move 
along the lines which have been suggested. Chinese 
intransigence is no license for American intransi-
gence. Our stake in the situation in the Western Pa-
cific is too large for that sort of infantile indulgence. 
I see great relevance in thinking deeply of the is-
sues which divide China and the United States to see 
if they can be recast in new and uncluttered molds. 
There is every reason, especially for young people, 
to examine most closely the premises of policy re-
garding China which were enshrined almost two 
decades ago. The fact is that the breakdown in Chi-
nese-United States relations was one of the great fail-
ures of my generation and it is highly doubtful that 
its full repair shall be seen in my lifetime. The 
problem, therefore, will fall largely to you. It is not 
a particularly happy inheritance, but there is reason 
to hope that it may fare better in your hands. 
Unlike my generation, you know more about Asia. 
You have a greater awareness of its importance to 
this nation and to the world. You have not had the 
experience of national trauma in moving abruptly 
from an era marked by an almost fawning benevo-
lence toward China to one of thorough disenchant-
ment. You were spared the fierce hostilities which 
rent this nation internally, as a sense of warmth, 
sympathy and security regarding China gave way to 
feelings of revulsion, hatred and insecurity. 
Your Chinese counterparts, the young people of 
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today's China-they are called the "Heirs of the Re-
volution" -have a similar gap to bridge as they look 
across the Pacific. Your generation in China, too, has 
been contained and isolated, and its view of the 
United States has been colored with the hates of 
another time. It has had no contact with you or, in-
deed, with much of the world outside China. 
On the other hand, those young people have grown 
up under easier conditions than the older generation 
of Chinese who lived their youth in years of continu-
ous war and revolution. It may be that they can face 
you and the rest of the world with greater equa-
nimity and assurance than has been the case at any 
time in modern Chinese history. 
I urge you to think for yourselves about China. I 
urge you to approach, with a new objectivity, that 
vast nation, with its great population of industrious 
and intelligent people. Bear in mind that the peace 
of Asia and the world will depend on China :;i.s much 
as it does on this nation, the Soviet Union, or any 
other, not because Chinese is Communist but because 
China is China-among the largest countries in the 
world and the most populous. 
Mao Tse-Tung remarked in an interview several 
years ago that "future events would be decided by 
future generations." Insofar as his words involve the 
relationship of this nation and China, whether they 
prove to be a prophecy of doom or a forecast of a 
happier future will depend not so much on us, the 
"Old China Hands" of yesterday, but on you, the 
"New American Hands" of tomorrow. 
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